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DISPOSITION OF A FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
CASE WHEN DEFENDANT DIES PENDING 
APPEAL 
Uncertainty has arisen in the last few years as to the proper 
disposition of a federal criminal case when the defendant dies 
during the appeal of his conviction.• The bases of appellate juris-
diction and the level of the appeal2 bear significantly on the prob-
lem. The consequences of this disposition are important to the 
interests of the deceased defendant, his estate and survivors, and 
the society for whose protection the criminal justice system ex-
ists. 
This article discusses the way in which courts historically 
have disposed of such cases and the apparent change recently 
introduced by the United States Supreme Court. After an exami-
nation of the ramifications of the new and old rules, certain 
changes in current practice are recommended which will better 
serve the interests of the deceased, his survivors, and society as a 
whole. · 
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULE 
Until 1976, it was well settled that when a defendant in a 
federal criminal case died pending appellate review of his convic-
tion, all proceedings against him, including the indictment, 
abated, 3 and the conviction was dismissed on remand to the trial 
court.' This policy applied to both prison sentences and fines. 
1 Although it is impossible to ascertain precisely how frequently this situation arises, 
the best estimate based on the number of cases uncovered in the course of writing this 
article is not more than ten annually. More likely, it is only two or three. 
' See notes 26-32 and accompanying text infra. 
3 Discussion with local, state, and federal authorities revealed that while abatement 
terminates the proceedings and erases the conviction from the deceased's record, the 
arrest record and attendant reports and investigative data remain on file. Telephone 
interviews with Ben Brewer, Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit, Michigan 
(January, 1979); unnamed records officers, Michigan State Police, Ypsilanti, Michigan, 
and Ann Arbor Police, Ann Arbor, Michigan (January, 1979). 
' Widespread acceptance of this rule is indicated by the number of cases which 
merely state that the cause abates, with little or no discussion of the question. See, e.g., 
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); Menken v. Atlanta, 
131 U.S. 405 (1889); List v. Pennsylvania, 131 U.S. 396 (1888); United States v. Jones, 
498 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1974); l!nited States v. Hudson, 460 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Sikes, 456 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1972); Daniel v. United States, 268 F.2d 849 (5th 
Cir. 1959); Baldwin v. United States, 72 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1934); Rossi v. United States, 
21 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1927); McGovern v. United States, 280 F. 73 (7th Cir. 1922); Pino v. 
143 
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The rationale for the rule derived from the belief that the 
goals of the criminal law-incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribu-
tion, and deterrence5-would not be furthered by upholding the 
deceased's conviction. 6 When the defendant dies, the goals of 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution are no longer at-
tainable, and punishing the deceased's family would be unjust in 
society's view.7 Moreover, the deterrent value of criminal sanc-
tions is unaffected by the disposition of the appeal after death.8 
Courts have elaborated on this rationale when disposing of a 
criminal fine assessed against the deceased's estate.9 Unlike civil 
damages, which attach to and are enforceable against the estate, 10 
fines are considered penalties rather than compensation for injury 
to the state. 11 Because of the impossibility of punishing the de-
ceased and the perceived injustice in punishing the family, the 
fine, like a prison sentence, abates together with the conviction.12 
These principles were most recently discussed in Durham v. 
United States, 13 in which the appellant died while his petition for 
certiorari was pending. In a per curiam opinion, the United States 
Supreme Court, relying on Crooker v. United States, 14 granted 
the petition, vacated the conviction below, and remanded the 
United States, 278 F. 479 (7th Cir. 1921); Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911); 
United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254 (9th Cir. 1909). 
• See P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 241-61 (1960). 
' United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. United States v. New York, Central & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 1908). 
'Id. at 282. 
8 Formerly, English law imposed an attainder on the convicted felon's property; his 
entire estate, including real and personal property, was forfeited. This practice stemmed 
from the belief that deprivation of the estate would have significant deterrent value. This 
practice was not adopted in the American colonies. S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 
706-07 (2d ed. 1973). For a study of the deterrent effects of various criminal sanctions, 
see DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON 
CRIME RATES (1978). 
' See, e.g., United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. United States v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 
1908). 
•• Id. at 280. 
11 The fine as penalty is distinguished from state assessment against the offender in 
a jurisdiction with a Victim Compensation statute which provides for restitution by the 
offender. See generally H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF 
CRIME (1974), and Part III C infra. 
12 United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. United States v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 1908). 
Fines have not traditionally been viewed as retributive, so that they do not carry over to 
the estate to satisfy the vengeful needs of the victim or the state. See also the discussion 
of the retributive function of offender contribution to victims, Part III C infra. 
13 401 U.S. 481 (1971) (per curiam). 
" 325 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1963). In Crooker, the defendant died while his appeal was 
pending before the circuit court. The decision provides an excellent synthesis of the cases 
applying the rule of abatement when the defendant dies. 
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case to the district court for dismissal. Two minority opinions in 
Durham, however, presaged a change in the traditional rule. Jus-
tice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stew-
art, would have dismissed the petition as moot and "direct[ed] 
the Court of Appeals to note this action on its records. " 15 Thus, 
the conviction would have remained on record rather than have 
abated. No explanation was proffered for this abrupt departure 
from established practice. 
A dissent by Justice Blackmun advanced two reasons for 
dismissing the petition. First, he stated that the petition was 
untimely and therefore should not have been entertained by the 
Court. 16 Second, to dismiss the petition as moot, and thereby 
retain the conviction, would be more in accord with previous 
decisions that had remanded the deceased's case to the lower 
court for disposition "as the interests of law would require." 17 
Justice Blackmun took issue with the pril)ciple that a conviction 
should disappear from the record because of the petitioner's 
death and despite his failure to overturn it on appeal to the circuit 
court. He offered no reason why the conviction should stand even 
though no one would serve the sentence. 18 Justice Blackmun, 
however, did not advocate abandoning the rule at both levels of 
appeal. Rather, he supported Crooker and distinguished Durham 
on the ground that Crooker was an appeal of right before the 
circuit court, whereas Durham involved a second-level appeal on 
writ of certiorari. 19 This was the first appearance of the distinction 
1
• 401 U.S. at 483. 
" Id. at 484. The majority dealt with this problem by pointing out that the delay was 
caused by a clerical error, not by the appellant. Id. at 481-82. 
17 Id. at 484. The cases cited were American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 
781 (1946); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945); and United States v. Johnson, 
319 U.S. 503 (1943). The "interests of law" referred to by Justice Blackmun were not 
defined, but he seems to have misconstrued the three cited cases. He cited them in support 
of dismissing the writ but maintaining the conviction, whereas in each case the petition 
was dismissed and the cause remanded to the lower court for disposition. See also Crooker 
v. United States, 325 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1963), in which the court noted that in United 
States v. Johnson there was "no indication ... that [disposition of the fine] was done 
by any published opinion or order. Presumably, disposition was made by routine order 
[vacating and abating the fine]." 325 F.2d at 321. 
The Durham majority also cited American Tobacco, Singer, and Johnson in support 
of the remand of the case to the lower court for dismissal. 
" Justice Blackmun's position is most likely unrelated to the certainty of affirmance 
on appeal. Statistics show that most certiorari appeals heard by the Court are reversed 
or vacated. For the most recent available figures, see The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 332 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 298 
(1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 279 (1975); The Supreme 
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 278 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 
HARV. L. REv. 1, 277 (1974). 
" See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 484 (1971) (per curiam) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). The majority addressed this point in a fo<;>tnote, pointing out that petition-
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between an appeal of right and a discretionary appeal. Five years 
later this distinction apparently justified the overruling of 
Durham. 20 
II. THE NEW RULE 
In 1976 the Supreme Court, in Dove v. United States, 21 ex-
plicitly overruled Durham in a brief per curiam opinion denying 
certiorari in a case where the defendant died while the petition 
was pending.22 The denial of certiorari caused the conviction to 
remain on the deceased petitioner's record. The Court gave no 
rationale for breaking the precedent of Durham and previous 
cases, thus leaving unclear whether the ruling should be limited 
to cases before the Court on petitions for certiorari, or should be 
applied to all cases, at whatever level of appeal, in which the 
defendant died while the appeal was pending. 23 
Two circuit courts have subsequently grappled with this 
question. In United States v. Moehlenkamp, 24 the Seventh Cir-
cuit abated the deceased appellant's conviction, expressly limit-
ing Dove to Supreme Court appeals on certiorari.25 The court 
ing for certiorari is as much a right as is an appeal of right. The Court concluded that 
"[s]ince death will prevent any review on the merits, whether the situation is an appeal 
or certiorari, the distinction between the two would not seem to be important for present 
purposes." 401 U.S. at 483. 
This argument misses the point of the appeal of right/discretionary appeal distinc-
tion, which is that the defendant be given the benefit of the doubt until he has exhausted 
his right to be heard on the merits, that is, his right to appeal. While all criminal defen-
dants have the right to petition for certiorari, none have the right to be heard by the 
Supreme Court on the merits unless Congress has so provided. Therefore, those who do 
not fall under the appeal of right provision, 28 U .S.C. § 1257 (1976), have exhausted their 
right to appeal after being heard in the federal circuit courts of appeal. See notes 27 and 
accompanying text infra. 
20 See Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam), and text accompany-
ing notes 21-22 infra. The distinction has also arisen in other contexts. See, e.g., Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), in which the Court held that indigent defendants need not 
be given free transcripts and assistance of counsel in discretionary appeals. 
21 423 U.S. 325 (1976) (per curiam). 
22 The decision reads in its entirety: "The Court is advised that the petitioner died 
at New Bern, N.C., on November 14, 1975. The petition for certiorari is therefore dis-
missed. To the extent that Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481 (1971) (per curiam), 
may be inconsistent with this ruling, Durham is overruled." Dove v. United States; 423 
U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (per curiam). 
22 The only case that has come down from the Court since Dove in which a criminal 
appellant died is Warden, Green Haven State Prison v. Palermo, 431 U.S. 911 (1977). It 
reads: "The Court is advised that respondent was found dead at John F. Kennedy Airport, 
N.Y., on March 25, 1977. The petition for certiorari is therefore dismissed. Dove v. United 
States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976)." This casts no light on the effect which Dove has on cases 
other than those which are before the Court on certiorari. 
z• 557 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1977). Defendant died while his appeal was pending before 
the circuit court. 
n "The Court's recent decision in Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976), ... 
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invoked the appeal of right/discretionary appeal distinction ex-
pounded in Justice Blackmun's Durham dissent. 26 Without dis-
cussing the different types of appeals, the Ninth Circuit similarly 
limited Dove in United States v. Bechtel, 27 in which the defen-
dant died while review of his conviction was pending. 
Moehlenkamp's limitation of Dove to Supreme Court certior-
ari petitions is supported by Justice Blackmun's advocacy of the 
Crooker rule in his Durham dissent. 28 The reasoning of that dis-
sent apparently persuaded the Dove Court to overrule Durham. 29 
Further, there is no indication that the distinction between the 
two levels of appeal was rejected by the Dove Court. 
The policies underlying Supreme Court appeals lend validity 
to the Moehlenkamp distinction. The discretionary appeal via 
writ of certiorari was not intended as an appeal to which all are 
entitled, 30 nor was it meant to provide a court of last resort, since 
that would overload the Court's docket. 31 Rather, the discretion-
ary appeal was created to give the Court the opportunity to de-
cide those important cases not coming before it by original juris-
hes raised some doubts es to the propriety of our following the Durham disposition. . . . 
[W)e ere of the view that Dove overrules Durham only with respect to the appropriate 
disposition of moot petitions for certiorari." 557 F.2d et 127. 
21 The court stated: 
The mootness of en appeal of right taken from e criminal conviction brings into play 
different considerations then does the mootness of e petition for certiorari commit-
ted to the Supreme Court's discretion .... The Supreme Court may dismiss the 
petition without prejudicing the rights of e deceased petitioner, for he hes already 
had the benefit of the appellate review of his conviction to which he was entitled 
of right. In contrast, when en appeal hes been taken from e criminal conviction to 
the court of appeals end death hes deprived the accused of his right to our decision, 
the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand convicted without resolu-
tion of the merits of his appeal. 
Id. et 128. 
n 547 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiem). 
" 401 U.S. et 484 (Bleckmun, J., dissenting). Fore discussion of Crooker, see note 
14 end accompanying text supra. 
21 Only two members of the Dove majority actually changed their positions between 
Durham end Dove. Justices Douglas and Brennan voted in the majority in Durham and 
subsequently overruled themselves by voting in the Dove majority. Justice White, who 
was in the Durham majority, dissented without opinion in Dove. Justices Black and 
Harlan had retired before Dove was decided . 
.. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 260-62 (1927). 
11 Frankfurter and Landis state: 
[T)he conservation of the Supreme Court as the arbiter of legal issues of national 
significance . . . could hardly be attained so long as there persisted the obstinate 
conception that the Court was to be the vindicator of all federal rights. . . . Litiga-
tion which did not represent a wide public interest was left to the state courts of 
last resort and to the circuit courts of appeals, always reserving to the Supreme 
Court power to determine that some national interest justified invoking its jurisdic-
tion. 
Id. at 260-61. 
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diction or appeal of right, and to regulate and maintain control 
over its caseload.32 · 
Policy and history, then, support the Moehlenkamp interpre-
tation of Dove. Until the Supreme Court elaborates the intended 
scope of Dove, Moehlenkamp probably will stand as the prevail-
ing interpretation. 33 
Ill. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
The importance of Durham and Dove can only be understood 
in light of their effects on survivors and third-party beneficiaries, 
since most ramifications of a conviction or abatement extend 
beyond the deceased appellant. The results of sustaining a de-
ceased appellant's conviction may include survival of criminal 
fines, denial of social welfare benefits, carry-over of victim com-
pensation liabilities, and perpetuation of social stigma.34 The dis-
cussion below examines these consequences in the wake of Dove. 
A. Fines 
The status of fines apparently is the only post-conviction 
issue unchanged by the mode of disposition pursuant to Dove. As 
noted previously, 35 under the procedure prior to Dove a fine 
abated along with all other sanctions against the deceased defen-
dant on the theory that it would be unjust to punish the family 
for the deceased's crime.38 Dove is silent on the question of the 
disposition of fines. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Durham, how-
ever, indicates that even if the conviction were retained, an af-
fected third party could seek court relief from burdens imposed 
32 Id. 
" See note 23 supra regarding Warden, Green Haven State Prison v. Palermo, 431 
U.S. 911 (1977), the only Supreme Court case to cite Dove. 
" This is not an exhaustive list of the repercussions of a defendant's death. There are 
others which come to mind, but which have not been adjudicated and are so rare as to be 
virtually hypothetical. Consider, for example, the convicted smuggler whose airplane has 
been confiscated for carrying contraband across the border. If he dies, it would be unclear 
whether his estate could reclaim the airplane in spite of the decedent's conviction. 
" See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra. 
31 United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. United States v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 1908), 
deals briefly with the distinction between depleting the estate after the death of the 
appellant and the depletion that occurs when a fine is paid while the defendant is alive: 
It may be said, of course, that there is very little difference between the loss which 
his family would have sustained if the money had been collected before his death, 
and the loss which it will now sustain if it is collected from his estate. But if the 
money had been collected before his death, he would have been punished. If it is 
collected now, his family will be punished, and he will not be punished. 
152 F. at 282. 
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by the conviction.37 Assuming, then, that Dove is based on Justice 
Blackmun's Durham dissent, 38 Dove does not alter the policy of 
abating fines under Durham and its antecedents. 
This result is consistent with the policy underlying the abate-
ment of fines upon the defendant's death. There is no indication 
that the "interests of justice" which mandate the abatement of 
fines are different in the case of discretionary appeals, which 
Dove removes from the Durham rule of abatement. The concern 
with sparing the family of-the deceased the burden of the fine is 
entirely distinct from the appeal of right/discretionary appeal 
dichotomy which apparently justified Dove. Thus, even under 
Dove, a fine should abate upon the death of the defendant. 
B. Survivor and Third-Party Social Welfare Benefits 
The greatest tangible effect of affirmance of a deceased's 
conviction is on his estate and survivors. Certain social welfare 
programs such as retirement pay for government employees39 and 
veterans' benefits•0 are not available to the surviving spouse or 
children of one convicted of certain crimes, primarily those 
against national security.41 Under Durham, these benefits sur-
" Justice Blackmun notes, "If, by chance, the suggestion of death has some conse-
quence upon the survivor rights of a third party (a fact not apparent to this Court), the 
third party so affected is free to make his own timely suggestion of death to the court of 
appeals." 401 U.S. at 485. 
This statement implies that affected third parties may still have fines cancelled after 
the defendant's death. Presumably, Justice Blackmun found no fault with the long-
established tradition of abating fines. The statement may not, however, apply to other 
collateral effects, perhaps because they are non-punitive, or because Justice Blackmun 
simply did not consider them. If he did intend that collateral effects other than fines 
should be negated by the appellate courts, and if the Doue Court did in fact adopt the 
reasoning of his Durham diBBent, then Doue changes only the technical, not the practical, 
effect of the conviction, except for stigma resulting from it. If the third party consequences 
of the conviction are removed, the conviction is pro forma only and has no practical 
tangible effect. The remainder of this article assumes that Doue is not so limited in effect, 
and that Justice Blackmun in Durham did indeed distinguish between abatement of 
punitive sanctions, such as fines, and abatement of such non-punitive collateral conse-
quences as deprivation of social welfare benefits and victim compensation liability. This 
assumption is justified by the absence of well-articulated or accepted theories supporting 
the latter in comparison with the clear acceptance of the policy behind the former. 
The trial court report of Durham does not mention the kind of sentence imposed. This 
fact perhaps explains why the Court did not know if a fine had been assessed. Durham 
had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 474 (1976), a counterfeiting statute providing for a 
$5000 fine or up to fifteen years imprisonment or both . 
.. This is impossible to ascertain, since the Doue Court gave no reason for its decision. 
For the full text of that decision, see note 22 supra . 
•• 5 u.s.c. § 8312 (1976) . 
•• 38 u.s.c. §§ 3404-3405 (1976). 
" The due process argument challenging rescission of these benefits is beyond the 
scope of this article. No cases have been found in which survivors of a deceased appellant 
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vived because the conviction was to be vacated and treated as if 
it had never existed. Dove, however, seemingly requires depriva• 
tion of those benefits, because the conviction is retained on the 
record. 42 Competing policy questions compel discussion of the 
validity and justice of this result. 
Deprivation of survivors' benefits is analogous to imposing a 
fine on the estate in that it penalizes the estate for the wrongs of 
the accused. While under prevailing theory it is unjust to fine the 
family for the deceased's crime, 43 social welfare statutes render 
certain benefits unavailable to such families. The legislative his• 
tory of the various benefit statutes is silent as to the policies 
behind the forfeiture provisions. 44 Therefore, one can only hypoth• 
esize the reasons for treating deprivation of such benefits differ• 
ently from criminal fines. 
First, there is an apparent difference between cancelling a 
fine and giving money to the survivors of a convicted criminal. 
Ideals of justice and fairness aside, it is understandable that the 
public would not want its tax dollars to go to a felon's family. 
Fines, however, are judicially imposed and their abatement does 
not directly affect the taxpayer. 
Moreover, there is something in the nature of the association 
with the government, from which the deceased derived benefits, 
which suggests special treatment. The statutes considered here, 
concerning government pensions and veterans' benefits, create an 
almost contractual relationship between the employee and the 
government. Such a contract requires faithful execution and sup• 
port of the laws and the government itself. The crimes for which 
benefits are forfeited-subversive activities and treason-are the 
most serious breach of that contract. It is this serious breach 
which causes the government to react so strongly as to cut off all 
benefits, to the employee and his dependents alike. In contract 
terms, since the employee has not performed, the government 
need not perform, and all benefits are forfeited. 
An alternative rationale for requiring forfeiture is that viola• 
tors of national security laws are so reprehensible that they de• 
serve sanctions which punish not only them but also their depen• 
dents. This argument characterizes the deprivation to survivors 
contested such a loss. For a general discussion of the due process considerations involved 
in the deprivation of social welfare benefits, see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1950). 
" But see note 37 supra. 
" See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra. 
" See S. REP. No. 862, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1961] U.S. CooE CoNG. 
& Ao. NEWS 2928 (government pensions); S. REP. No. 664, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted 
in (1959] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2216; and H. REP. No. 279, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 
reprinted in (1957] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1214 (veterans benefits). 
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as part of the punishment for the criminal's acts. The flaw in such 
reasoning is that similar sanctions are not imposed on veterans 
or government employees who commit other heinous crimes, such 
as murder. It is difficult to believe that the legislature would react 
so strongly to such a narrow group of criminals, but continue to 
bestow its largess on others guilty of equally shocking crimes_. 
While it is arguable that treason affects the entire nation while 
murder affects primarily the victim and those close to him, there 
is little logic in depriving the traitor and his survivors of benefits 
but not similarly ·sanctioning the murderer. 
The contractual nature of government service seems there-
fore the more persuasive of the arguments justifying deprivation 
of survivors' benefits. Under that theory, forfeiture is not puni-
tive. The survivors have a statutory entitlement subject to the 
employee's fulfillment of certain conditions. When those condi-
tions are not met, the benefits are no longer due them. Like the 
policies supporting abatement of fines, the reasons for requiring 
forfeiture of social welfare benefits are independent of the policies 
behind the appeal of right/discretionary appeal distinction. Since 
deprivation of benefits is arguably non-punitive, however, it is 
different from a fine imposed on the family for the acts of the 
deceased. Therefore, abatement of the deprivation is not man-
dated by the same considerations that require abatement of the 
fine.45 If a suit ever arises in which the survivors request the court 
to abate the deprivation, it will probably be unsuccessful. 
C. Victim Compensation 
Although less than one-quarter of the states have enacted 
victim compensation statutes,48 the trend is toward adoption of 
this type of legislation.47 While most compensation comes from 
state funds, at least two states have statutory provisions for direct 
contribution by the offender. 48 Such statutes are of special inter-
est in the context of this article. 49 Under the statutory schemes, 
•• See note 37 supra. 
" See ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.010-180 (Supp. 1978); CAL. Gov'T CooE § 13959-13974 
(West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-518-526 (1974); HAW. REv. STAT.§ 351 (1976); Mo. 
ANN. CooE art. 26A (1968); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, §§ 1-8 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ch. 217 (1973); N.J. STAT.§§ 52:4B-1-52:4B-21 (West 1978); N.Y. ExEc. LAW§§ 622-634 
(1978); WASH REV. CooE ANN. ch. 7.68 (West 1978). 
" See generally H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 11. 
" See CAL. Gov'T CooE § 13967 (West Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 26A, § 17 
(1976). 
" Statutory contribution is distinguished from informal restitution, such as returning 
shoplifted goods or replacing a broken window, under the supervision and prompting of 
police, the court or the parties themselves. See, e.g., Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by 
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compensation out of state funds is independent of the conviction 
or even the identification of the offender.50 In states where the 
offender is required to contribute, it is only after full adjudication 
of his guilt. The question is, therefore, whether the family of a 
deceased defendant must contribute to the state compensation 
fund in his stead. 
Under the Durham rule, liability to the victim would abate 
along with the conviction.51 The underlying theory is that liability 
should not attach until the defendant has received full appellate 
review and has been finally adjudged guilty. The analysis under 
Dove, however, is more complex. If, as in the words of the Califor-
nia statute, 52 such payment is a fine, it should not be assessed 
against the estate of the deceased offender.53 The term "fine," 
however, may not literally mean a penalty which should abate 
under Durham. 54 Such a construction is supported by examina-
tion of the various theories behind the statutes. 
One of the grounds for offender contribution is the mitigation 
of the victim's desire for vengeance.55 A victim's vengeful motives 
will likely carry over to the deceased's family. Under this ration-
ale, the estate should remain liable for contribution after the 
convicted offender's death in order to mollify the victim. An addi-
tional reason for contribution is to afford the victim an alterna-
tive to a tort suit58 in which most offenders would be judgment-
proof because of their generally low incomes. The offender's con-
the Criminal Offender to his Victim: Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern 
Correctional Process, 61 J. CRtM. L.C. & P.S. 152 (1970). 
50 See generally Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an 
Analysis of its Present Usefulness, 5 RICH. L. REV. 71 (1970); H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, 
supra note 11. 
" This, however, does not affect civil liability. 
" CAL. Gov'T CooE § 13967 (West Supp. 1979). The statute reads: 
Upon a person being convicted of a crime of violence committed in the State of 
California resulting in the injury or death of another person, if the court finds that 
the defendant has the present ability to pay a fine and finds that the economic 
impact of the fine upon the defendant's dependents will not cause such dependents 
to be dependent on public welfare the court shall, in addition to any other penalty, 
order the defendant to pay a fine commensurate with the offense committed. The 
fine or penalty assessment imposed pursuant to this section shall be deposited in 
the Indemnity Fund in the State Treasury ... and the proceeds of which shall be 
available for appropriation by the Legislature to indemnify persons filing claims 
pursuant to this article. 
53 See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra. But see note 37 supra. 
" The fine assessed for compensatory purposes is not subject to the so-called penalty 
assessment provisions of the California Penal Code, which provide that "there shall be 
levied a penalty assessment in an amount equal to five dollars ($5) for every twenty dollars 
($20), or fraction thereof, of every fine, penalty, and forfeiture imposed and collected by 
the courts for criminal offenses." CAL. PENAL CooE § 13521 (West Supp. 1979). 
" S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 4-5 (1970). 
" Laster, supra note 50, at 81. 
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tribution, however, is typically much less than a civil damage 
award. 57 If, instead of a tort suit, the offender contributes to the 
state fund, the victim is fully recompensed with available state 
monies.58 
Under the above theories, the effect of Dove would be to 
preserve liability. Since these theories are victim-oriented rather 
than punitive, the death of the offender should not affect the 
victim's compensation.59 
Another theory for requiring victim compensation is rehabili-
tation.60 This theory is manifested in those non-statutory systems 
in which the offender makes full restitution, as opposed to a mere 
contribution to a state fund. The rationale is that putting the 
offender in touch with his victim personalizes the criminal justice 
system "so as to impress upon the mind of the criminal that he 
has injured a human being, not some impersonal entity known as 
the state .... One benefit of a meaningful system of restitution 
is that it would keep the criminal within the normal so-
ciety .... " 62 Under this rationale, contribution becomes mean-
ingless once the defendant dies. 
Because of the undeveloped state of the law in this area, it 
is unclear which is the dominant theory behind victim compens'a-
tion involving offender contribution. Until one or the other pre-
vails, it is impossible to ascertain Dove's effect on those cases. As 
this area of legislation expands victim compensation statutes 
must be considered in deciding the ideal disposition of Dove-type 
cases, although the degree of the estate's liability to the victim is 
not related to the appeal of right/discretionary appeal distinction 
which apparently justified Dove. 
D. Stigma 
Although some stigma attaches irrevocably when one is ac-
cused, and acquittal or reversal on appeal will not change the way 
in which many view the accused and his family, vacating the 
conviction is one way to relieve innocent survivors of that burden. 
Even the possibility of Supreme Court affirmance63 should not 
preclude the survivors from pursuing their interest in a good farn-
57 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CooE § 13967 (West Supp. 1979), which puts a maximum of 
$10,000 on the offender's contribution. 
" See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 11, at 282-84, for a discussion of allowable 
benefits. 
" See note 35 supra. 
•• Laster, supra note so; at 81. 
" See note 49 supra. 
" Laster, supra note 50, at 80-81. 
13 But see statistics on Supreme Court reversals cited at note 18 supra. 
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ily name. While stigma may appear insignificant in comparison 
with economic and legal ramifications, it is probably the most 
common consequence for the survivors when a convicted defen-
dant dies pending appeal. In addition to day-to-day embarrass-
ment, there may be more tangible manifestations of stigma. For 
example, employment opportunities may be denied when a crimi-
nal family background is disclosed. Durham, perhaps out of gen-. 
erosity as well as considerations of utility and justice, ameliorated 
the effects of the conviction as much as possible. Even if vacating 
the conviction because of death does not fully remove stigma, it 
may have some effect because it admits the possibility that the 
conviction was erroneous and would have been overturned had 
the appeal been completed. Under Dove, however, all stigma 
remains, since convictions do not abate. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR REFORM 
The Supreme Court overruled Durham apparently because 
the appeal of right satisfies the defendant's right to appellate 
review. However valid this line between appeals as of right and 
discretionary appeals may be, the recorded conviction of the de-
ceased appellant does little to further the goals of criminal jus-
tice.84 It may in fact result in injustice to the surviving family 
members, especially in light of the likelihood of reversal by the 
Supreme Court if the Court grants certiorari.85 
Provision should be made for representatives of the deceased 
to continue prosecution of the appeal if they so desire. This idea 
is not new-at least one state has followed such a procedure. 88 The 
Court already has a rule providing for this practice but has appar-
ently limited it to civil suits.87 The proposed procedure would 
allow survivors to settle the issue of the conviction's validity and 
would therefore have several advantages over current federal 
practice. 
First, survivors would have the opportunity to qualify for 
social welfare benefits if the conviction were overturned. This 
would not conflict with society's interest in withholding those 
benefits, since that interest applies only to survivors of those 
whose convictions are ultimately upheld. 
" See text accompanying notes 5-19 supra. 
•• See note 18 supra. 
" See Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62 (1962) (per curiam), in which the administratrix 
of deceased's estate was substituted as the appellant pursuant to Ohio practice at that 
time. 
" "Whenever either party shall die after filing notice of appeal to this court or filing 
of petition for writ of certiorari in this court, the proper representative of the deceased 
may ... be substituted as a party to the proceeding ... .'' U.S. SuP. CT. R. 48(1). 
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Second, this procedure would determine the issue of the es-
tate's liability for contribution to the deceased's victim. On the 
one hand, the victim loses nothing in a state with a compensation 
fund, since he or she will be compensated from the fund regard-
less of the guilt or innocence of the particular defendant or indeed 
whether or not there is any identification of a suspect in the case. 
On the other hand, the defendant's estate has an opportunity to 
finalize the matter and to avoid liability should the conviction be 
in error. 
A third benefit of this procedure would be the possible avoid-
ance of the family stigma that attaches to conviction, and the 
reinforcement of survivors' belief that justice has been done. 
Questions as to standing68 may be answered by analogy to 
those instances in which a living defendant appeals after his sent-
ence has been satisfied. The trend is to allow standing to appeal 
when there is a possibility that the defendant will suffer collateral 
legal consequences, including loss of social benefits.69 Even in 
situations where the only consequence is stigma, standing has 
been found when it is shown that stigma may, for example, affect 
job or educational opportunities.70 An innocent survivor suffering 
such effects of a conviction can demonstrate at least as great a 
stake as the ex-convict, so that standing is no less reasonable for 
the family of the deceased than for the living defendant.71 
Allowing appeals by representatives would add a negligible 
number of cases to the Supreme Court docket. In addition, it 
" Art. 3 § 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Court hear only cases or 
controversies. In the context of criminal appeals, it is arguable whether such a controversy 
exists if the defendant has died and can no longer be sanctioned by the criminal process. 
As the text illustrates, however, a controversy is demonstrable when third parties have a 
justiciable stake in the outcome of such an appeal. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
39 (3d ed. 1976). 
" See Note, Criminal Law-Standing Based on Collateral Civil Consequences, 14 
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 231 (1978); Note, Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, 
74 HARV. L. REV. 1615 (1961). 
,o Id. 
71 In extraordinary circumstances a survivor, through a bill in Congress, may attack 
collaterally a conviction that works harm to him or her. Consider, for example, the at-
tempts of Antionette Slovik to regain the veteran's pension and insurance benefits she lost 
when her husband Edward was convicted and executed for desertion in World War II. The 
Senate bill which would have awarded those benefits was "indefinitely postponed" (and 
thus effectively killed) at an executive session of the Judiciary Committee on September 
11, 1979, following Mrs. Slovik's death September 7th. The bill was not worded to award 
benefits posthumously. Telephone interview with a staff member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee (September 24, 1979). For a chronicle of Mrs. Slovik's previous attempts to 
have her husband pardoned and to be awarded the benefits, see N.Y. Times,.Feb. 8, 1978, 
at 8, col. 6; Feb. 7, 1978, at 6, col. 1; Aug. 17, 1977, § 4, at 15, col. 3; Aug. 13, 1977, at 1, 
col. 5; July 27, 1977, § 3, at 2, col. 4; June 16, 1977, et 18, col. 4; Apr. 28, 1977, § 3, at 2, 
col. 4; Apr. 6, 1977, at 16, col. 4; Dec. 25, 1976, at 22, col. 1; Nov. 13, 1976, at 24, col. 2. 
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would give the Court the opportunity to hear a case it felt was of 
central importance, even though the defendant had died.72 
In those cases the Court would not want to hear, the petition 
for certiorari should be denied, as it would be if the defendant 
were still alive; this is contrary to the disposition in Durham, 
which granted the petition in order to vacate the conviction. The 
mere fortuity of a petitioner's death should not result in overturn-
ing a conviction which would have stood but for the defendant's 
death. In this respect, the suggested reform is consistent with 
Dove, in that the Court may still reject a petition for certiorari 
when the appellant has died. In effect, the proposed rule repre-
sents a compromise between the interest of the survivors in over-
turning the deceased's conviction and the interest of the Court in 
controlling its docket. Even if the Court refused certiorari, the 
survivors might still be able to avoid the consequences of the 
conviction, per Justice Blackmun's language in his Durham dis-
sent.73 
Many benefits and few costs would accrue in allowing the 
deceased appellant's personal representatives to prosecute the 
appeal in the Supreme Court. Since such an appeal would be by 
writ of certiorari, the Court would continue to exercise its discre-
tion as to the acceptance of a particular case. The Court would 
have no greater burdens and there would be further opportunity 
for justice in individual cases. 
CONCLUSION 
As the law now stands, a federal defendant who dies pending 
his appeal of right before the circuit court will automatically be 
cleared; the conviction and all proceedings will abate. At the 
second level of appeal, however, if the proceeding is by certiorari 
rather than by right, the defendant's death will result in the 
" The Court has on at least one occasion decided a case mooted by the death of the 
appellant. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961). After reversing the appellant's 
conviction for drug addiction, the Court was notified that the defendant had died prior 
to oral argument. The Court denied California's peition for rehearing and upheld the 
reversal without discussion. 371 U.S. 905 (1961). Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart 
dissented, arguing that the judgment should have been vacated and remanded to the state 
court for disposition under state law. The dissenters cited Stewart v. Southern R. Co., 315 
U.S. 784 (1942), in which a remand by the Court for a new trial was vacated as moot when 
the parties settled. 371 U.S. 905, 905-06 (1961). 
If a case such as Robinson arose today, disposition would not be affected by Dove, 
because Robinson was an appeal of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976). Applying the 
appeal of right/discretionary appeal distinction, the case would properly be dismissed and 
the conviction abated, because the defendant had not received his full statutory right to 
review. See note 26 supra. 
73 See note 37 supra. 
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automatic dismissal of certiorari and the finalization of the con-
viction on the record. Because of the effect of the conviction, 
survivors may suffer consequences which would not have resulted 
had the defendant lived and successfully contested his convic.-
tion. Survivors should be given the right to continue to prosecute 
appeals before both the circuit courts of appeal and the Supreme 
Court in an effort to vindicate the deceased, and to retain the 
social and legal rights they might otherwise lose. 
-Lori R. Dickerman 
